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A New Approach to U.S. Enforcement of Antitrust
Laws Against Foreign Cartels
by Douglas E. Rosenthal* and Benjamin H. Flowe, Jr.**
International cartels often conflict with U.S. economic ideals and
institutions, creating difficulties for U.S. businesses, consumers, and often
the government itself. Recently, many troublesome cartels, such as
OPEC, have involved foreign state actions and foreign sovereign policies
creating new obstacles to the effective enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws.
The proposed Cartel Restriction Act of 1979,1 a bill considered in the
U.S. Mouse of Representatives during the last session of Congress, is an
attempt to provide a new mechanism to enable U.S. Government anti-
trust enforcement agencies to deal more effectively with international
cartels. The proposed Act, House Bill 4661, would impose certain re-
porting requirements on U.S. entities who are asked to engage in foreign
cartels and would create substantial civil penalties for those who fail to
report. 2 It would also codify the act of state doctrine,3 the foreign com-
* Partner, Southerland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, D.C.; Formerly Chief, Foreign
Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1977-1980. A.B. 1961,
LL.B. 1966, and Ph.D. 1970, Yale University.
** Executive Editor, North CarolinaJournal of International Law and Commercial Regulation; A.B.
1978, Duke University; J.D. expected 1981, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
I H.R. 4661, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (proposed amendment to 15 U.S.C. §§ 20 & 21
(1976)).
2 Id. sec. 2, § 20.
3 Id. § 21. The act of state doctrine has been defined as "an act of a foreign state by
which the state has exercised itsjurisdiction to give effect to its public interests." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 (1965). "A typical state
action treated as an 'act of state' is the taking by a state of property within its own territory."
Id. § 41, comment d. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
Although the authors have certain reservations about the statutory codification of this doc-
trine, this article will focus only on the reporting requirements of the proposed Cartel Restric-
tion Act of 1979. It should be noted, however, that the Department of State has opposed the
Bill's codification of the doctrine on the grounds that the Bill only addresses a portion of the
doctrine and would thus cause confusion, Hearings on HR. 4661 Before the Subcommittee on Con-
sumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980) (statement of William T. Lake, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State) [here-
inafter cited as 1980 Hearings] (copy on file in the office of the North Carolina Journal ofInternational
Law and Commercial Regulation), and the Department of Justice has also opposed the codification
on the grounds that the "doctrine is particularly suitable for [flexible] case-by-case development
by the courts rather than by the use of specific legislatively mandated rules imposed on the
courts." Id. (statement of John H. Shenefield, Associate Attorney General, Department of Jus-
tice).
The Bill would require that the courts not decline jurisdiction solely on the ground that a
case would necessitate an examination of the reasons for any official act of a foreign state. The
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pulsion doctrine, 4 and the method of determining the subject matter ju-
risdiction that U.S. courts may exercise when international cartel
disputes involve official actions of a foreign state. 5 Thus, the Bill would
provide an early warning mechanism by which U.S. Government anti-
trust enforcers could gain better information at an early stage and
thereby, presumably, more effectively eliminate international cartel ac-
tivities harmful to U.S. interests.
House Bill 4661 is unpopular with multinational corporations, both
foreign and domestic, and with the governments of other nations. To
them it manifests all of the ethnocentrism, aggressiveness, and disregard
for the contrary policies and institutions of foreign governments, which
reject the interference with their sovereignty this bill would initiate, that
is seen abroad as one of the worst aspects of our legal system. 6 The Bill is
advocated at a time when many of the developed nations of the world
are reacting strongly to U.S. enforcement of antitrust laws against ac-
tions that have occurred wholly outside the United States. International
tension in this area has been dramatically exacerbated by the In re West-
t'nghouse Uranium case 7 which has involved and affected several foreign
Bill would, however, permil the courts to refrain from examining the validity or legality of any
official act by a foreign state within its territory by which act the foreign state has exercised
jurisdiction to give effect to its public interest. H.R. 4661, supra note 1, sec. 2, § 21 (a), (b)
(1979).
4 The foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine is an affirmative defense for a person whose
conduct was compelled by a foreign government. The defense is not available when the foreign
state simply acquiesces in, approves, or encourages a private restraint or when the foreign gov-
ernment would require conduct within U.S. territory that would violate U.S. law. See Conti-
nental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962); United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1977); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
1291 (D. Del. 1970). A version of the doctrine is discussed in relation to compliance with discov-
ery orders at text accompanying notes 15-16 infra.
Although this portion of the Bill is also beyond the scope of this article, the Department of
State has opposed its codification as needless. /980 Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of William
T. Lake). The Bill, however, would not change the common law definition outlined above. See
H.R. 4661, supra note 1, sec. 2, § 21(c).
5 The Bill codifies certain factors that should be considered by a court in determining
whether to exercise jurisdiction in an antitrust case when a foreign state has established a law or
policy requiring action by a U.S. entity that is inconsistent with U.S. antitrust laws. H.R. 4661,
supra note 1, sec. 2, § 21 (c). This section generally follows the developing common law. See
text accompanying notes 18-21 infra. Yet, the Justice Department has opposed such a codifica-
tion because the factors listed risk being interpreted as an exclusive list or priority ordering as
opposed to the flexible judicial approach that is developing. 1980 Hearings, supra note 3 (state-
ment of John H. Shenefield). The Department of State has also opposed this section for similar
reasons. Id. (statement of William T. Lake).
6 See, e.g., 1980 Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Michael Blechman).
7 For interlocutory decisions in this ongoing case, see In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,
617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill.
1979). See also In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 997
(10th Cir. 1977); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [19781 1 All E.R. 434
(House of Lords 1977). The case and its implications are discussed at text accompanying notes
26-36 infia. The reader should note that Mr. Rosenthal supervised the Justice Department
grand jury investigation of the uranium cartel. The investigation, relying on the same theories
as the plaintiffs' complaint in this private litigation, did not lead either to a criminal or civil
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governments, many of whom are allies of the United States. A number
of these states have reacted with retaliatory legislation that authorizes
limitations on discovery within their boundaries, authorizes refusal to en-
force U.S. antitrust judgments, and even allows a company to recover
most of the damages that have been assessed against it in the U.S. anti-
trust action.8
Congress is not insensitive to this international tension and the Car-
tel Restriction Act of 1979 has gone no further than preliminary hear-
ings. Passage in its present form would probably frustrate enforcement
of U.S. antitrust laws against international cartels and impede the com-
petitive power of U.S. businesses by provoking a new escalation of retali-
atory action by foreign governments. An American president could
destroy his foreign policy credibility if he signed it. The Bill, however,
could be made more effective and more acceptable to Congress and the
international community even in the current context.
This article will offer proposals for the Bill's improvement to that
end. First, as background to these proposals, the article will review the
jurisdictional "effects doctrine" which has facilitated the application of
U.S. antitrust law to foreign conduct and information, examine interna-
tional views on the propriety of the effects doctrine, offer a brief explana-
tion of the In re Westinghouse Uranium case and the international reaction
to it, and briefly discuss some of the retaliatory legislation enacted by
foreign states. Having set the background, the article will then examine
the proposed Cartel Restriction Act, focusing solely on the Bill's report-
ing requirements. Finally, specific proposals will be made for altering
those reporting requirements to achieve maximum enforcement effective-
ness with minimal international backlash.
In the courts of the United States, a governmental or a private party
may establish subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial activities of
a foreign based party via the effects doctrine. This doctrine, applied
most often in antitrust cases, gives U.S. courts subject matter jurisdiction
over acts performed by foreign entities outside the United States if those
acts were intended to and did directly and significantly affect com-
merce. 9 The Department of Justice has stated the essence of the effects
doctrine as follows: "When foreign transactions have a substantial and
foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, they are subject to U.S. law regard-
less of where they take place."' 0
prosecution of cartel members. See also note 35 infra. Mr. Rosenthal is, therefore, not an impar-
tial observer in these matters. Neither is the principal sponsor of HR. 4661, Congressman Al-
bert Gore, Jr. His constituency receives power from the Tennessee Valley Authority, one of the
plaintiffs' in the Chicago litigation.
8 See text accompanying notes 39-41 in/ra.
9 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
10 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977).
See generally Davidow, US Antitrust and Doing Business Abroad Recent Trends and Developments, 5
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 23 (1980); Lacey, Anttrust and Foreign Commerce: Reach and Grasp, 5
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (1980); J. GRIFFIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
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The basic justifications for the effects doctrine as applied in antitrust
cases are that (1) it would be inequitable to allow foreign enterprises,
especially those controlled by U.S. parents, freely to engage in conduct
that significantly damages persons within the United States when such
conduct is illegal for domestic entities, and (2) it could be an intrustion
into U.S. domestic commerce if private foreign cartels were free to fix
prices on U.S. imports. The doctrine recognizes that much of the world's
commerce takes place across national borders and that, for instance,
predatory pricing practices can cause as much damage to U.S. businesses
when they originate abroad as when they originate within the United
States.
Few countries other than the United States, however, agree that the
effects doctrine is an appropriate basis for subject matter jurisdiction,
especially for antitrust cases. Some nations oppose this exercise of juris-
diction beyond national borders as a matter of principle. Much opposi-
tion also comes from the fact that many foreign governments advance
policies, such as the selective encouragement of their export cartels, that
the U.S. government opposes. Many opponents of the effects doctrine
note that the United States does not discourage U.S. export cartels and
wonder about the seeming double standard.
First, as a matter of principle, many nations consider that prima
facie activities in furtherance of the illegal course of conduct within a
territory should be required to establish subject matter jurisdiction and
that limited exceptions should be subject to the overriding rights of the
territorial state. The justification of this territorial jurisdiction or "con-
stituent elements" theory is that it best delimits the appropriate sphere of
action of each state, minimizes the occurrence of overlapping jurisdic-
tion, and reduces international friction in the economic field where na-
tional policies and laws may well differ. The territorial principle of
jurisdiction also provides business planners with greater certainty about
their legal obligations."
The effects doctrine does have a basis in international law, however.
Its exercise in antitrust cases is said to be analogous to personal injury
crimes or torts, such as where pistols are fired into a country from outside
APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS (1979). See also United States v. Watch-
makers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963] Trade Cases (CCH) 70,600, at 77,456
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), order moded, [1965] Trade Cases (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("direct and
substantial restraint on ... foreign commerce of the United States"); United States v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949) madifdon othergroundr , 341 U.S. 593
(1951) ("a direct and influencing effect on trade").
I I Rosenthal, US Antilnust Laws, The Problem of Extraterrionalfiy, and the Role of the US.
Govmnmen In Prwate Litigaiion, in THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL: COR-
PORATION LAW AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK SERIES 389-99 (P.L.I. No. 339, (1980)). The British
view was espoused by Viscount Dilhorne in a speech on the Wet'nghouse case. "For many years
now, the U.S. has sought to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners in respect of acts done outside
the jurisdiction of that country. This is not in accordance with international law. . . ." In re
Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 460 (House
of Lords 1977), repn'nedi 17 INT'L L. MATERIALS 38, 50 (1978).
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its borders. In fact, the Permanent Court of International Justice pro-
vided some justification for the exercise of the effects doctrine in The S.S
Lotus in 1927.12 The Lotus case involved a collision between French and
Turkish ships in which a Turkish ship sank and eight Turkish nationals
were lost. The Turkish government argued that the French captain was
criminally liable under Turkish law for his acts which had an effect on
the Turkish ship. By finding that there was no principle of international
law which would prevent Turkey from instituting criminal proceedings
based on such effects, this case would appear to leave the extent to which
extraterritorial jurisdiction may be claimed to the discretion of the en-
forcing states. 13
Those who adhere to the territorial doctrine, however, would dist-
inguish The Lotus from economic cases. In cases of economic injuries to
U.S. persons committed by foreign private enterprises, especially where
the foreign enterprises were acting consistently with the economic poli-
cies of the host government, advocates of the territorial doctrine assert
that the United States should pursue the matter by diplomatic negotia-
tions as it would if the action were compelled by the foreign state itself.
It is argued that such negotiations pursued on a country to country level
would best assure that the conflicting interests of both sovereigns and
their respective nationals are adequately balanced, as compared to a de-
cision by a court in a single country of doubtful international expertise
and impartiality. ' 4 Thus, there are strong differences of opinion regard-
ing the propriety of the effects doctrine as a principle of jurisdiction.
Friction is also caused by procedural aspects of effects doctrine cases.
Any American antitrust case is likely to entail extensive discovery of busi-
ness documents. 15 In international cases discovery creates special
problems since the commercial information that is needed will be located
in foreign jurisdictions. This information is often voluminous and of a
sensitive nature. The target country rarely has laws on procedural dis-
covery that permit the breadth of information gathering allowed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The foreign government often views
the furnishing of such information pursuant to legal process as a breach
of its sovereignty because that government would not permit such infor-
12 [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10. For an excellent overview of this debate on the effects
doctrine and its application by the Federal Republic of Germany as well as its potential appli-
cation by the Commission of the European Communities, see Deringer, Extra TenrrtorialApplica-
tion of Anti-trst Laws-Modem Trends, I INT'L CoNT. L. & FINANCE REV. 323 (1980).
13 But see Haight, International Law and the Extratemtoral Application of the Antirust Laws, 63
YALE L.J. 639, 642 (1954) (stating that the court criticized the effects doctrine as a "basic mis-
conception regarding the international law competence of the United States"). See generally,
Kintner & Griffin,Jurirdction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REv. 199 (1977); Rahl, Foretign Commercejurisdiction of the Ameriian Antitrust Laws, 43
ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (1974).
14 Ste British Aide-Memoire to the Commission to the European Communities, reprinted in
I. BROWNtSE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 310 (3d ed. 1979).
15 Note, Dicovey of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation." Recent Developments in
the Law Concerning the Foreign Illgali Ecusefor Nonprodustion, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747 (1974).
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mation gathering to take place under its own laws. Further, compliance
with U.S. discovery requests often conflict with the target national's own
standards of commercial confidentially. The pill is especially bitter
where it is thought that the overbroad discovery will be used to assert
offensive substantive antitrust effects jurisdiction. For these reasons, the
procedural aspects of a U.S. extraterritorial antitrust case are often objec-
tionable.
Finally, from a substantive standpoint, the objectives of U.S. anti-
trust laws are often in conflict with contrary legislation or executive pol-
icy of the state in which the relevant activity took place. "[S]uch
legislation reflects national economic policy which may not coincide, and
may be directly in conflict, with that of other states."1 6 For the foreign
sovereign to permit and aid enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws in such
cases would thus undermine that state's own, contrary, economic policies
and laws.
U.S. courts have, relatively recently, begun to recognize the interna-
tional tensions described. Two principal doctrines are being evolved by
the courts in response to problems created by these tensions. The first
doctrine was developed by the United States Supreme Court in Societe
Internattonale v. Rogers 17 where the Court held that it would be unjust, in
the absence of bad faith, to punish a defendant for failing to comply with
a discovery order when such compliance would subject him to criminal
sanctions in his own country. '8 The Court did not adopt a hard and fast
rule in that case but opted instead for a balancing approach by which
decisions would be made on a case by case basis as to whether sanctions
for noncompliance with discovery orders should be imposed despite for-
eign nondisclosure laws. 19
A balancing approach is also used in the second principal doctrine
developed by the courts in cases where there may be a conflict of laws or
policies between the United States and another sovereign state. United
States Courts of Appeals in the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have
held that the direct and substantial effects of the acts complained about
do not provide a sufficient basis by themselves for subject matter jurisdic-
tion of an extraterritorial nature. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
16 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 475 (House
of Lords 1977).
17 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
18 Interestingly, the action of the Swiss Federal Attorney to prevent disclosure in the So-
ciete case was directly aimed at the specific litigation, although the action was consistent with
Swiss policy. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
19 See In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992, 997
(10th Cir. 1977) (discussing S&cilte Intenationale). It has been stated, however, that some "cases
have nevertheless been characterized by an almost automatic deference to such nondisclosure
laws." Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovr Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE
LJ. 612, 615 (1979) (citing in re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) (Panama-
nian law); First National City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dentid, 361 U.S. 948
(1960) (Panamanian law); In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) moahfwdsub
nora. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960) (Canadian law)).
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America, N.T & S.A. ,20 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
the need for comity in foreign relations and adopted a balancing ap-
proach to jurisdiction, weighing the following factors:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or alle-
giance of parties and the locations of principal places of businesses of
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either State can be
expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the fore-
seeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations
charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad.2 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted a similar approach
in Manningon M/lls, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.22 as did the Fifth Circuit in
Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. Ltd.,23 both of which
were decided in 1979. Further, the U.S. Department of Justice has
adopted this balancing approach as part of its proper exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in enforcing antitrust laws in U.S. foreign com-
merce.
24
Although the latter balancing approach is viewed as a positive step,
many foreign governments remain dissatisfied. The Timberlane approach
gives foreign businessmen and their governments little assurance that
their actions outside the United States, if approved by most nations'
laws, will not be subject to sanctions in U.S. courts. Such businessmen
and their governments could, perhaps, have some confidence that their
interests will be adequately represented through bilateral, diplomatic ne-
gotiations between states when conflicts have arisen out of acts done in
one nation that have affected entities in the other. When the decision is
made unilaterally by adjudication in U.S. courts, however, neither for-
eign businessmen nor their governments can be confident that their in-
terests and contrary views of the proper law will be fully considered. 25
20 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
21 Id at 614. The factors essentially follow those specified in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).
22 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979). It has been pointed out that the tests of the
Tmnberlane and Manmngon Mills decisions reflect a different approach. In T'imberlane, the court
considered whether jurisdiction was present by determining whether the effects on U.S. com-
merce were substantial enough relative to foreign policy concerns to justify the assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 549 F.2d at 613-14. In Mannington Mills, however, the court
adopted a two step test, determining first whether jurisdiction existed because of the intended
effects of the actions of defendant and second whether jurisdiction should be exercised if it
existed. 595 F.2d at 1292. See 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 667, 672-73 n.51 (1979). It should be noted
that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not follow either approach. In re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-56 (7th Cir. 1980).
23 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980).
24 See, e.g., Speech of D. Flexner, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, to
Georgia State Bar (Dec. 6, 1979); ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 10, at 6-7.
25 See, e.g., Blair, The Canadian Expertence, in GRIFFIN, Supra note 10, at 67 & 70 n.1 1. Also,
"[it is clear that the filing of amicus briefs by foreign governments, formal protests by foreign
governments and the two existing multilateral conventions have been of limited success in re-
ducing tensions and resolving disputes." GRIFFIN, id at xii (citations omitted).
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For example, under U.S. law there is virtually no valid excuse for a
defendant in a law suit to fail to appear before the court. In a purely
domestic context, absent fraud, failure to appear generally does and
should lead to entry of a default judgment against the nonappearing
party. Under U.S. law it is possible and appropriate to appear in court
to assert as a defense that the court lacks jurisdiction over the matter or
the person without thereby necessarily conceding that one accepts the
court's jurisdiction. The same principle does not apply in many foreign
jurisdictions, however. A foreign enterprise whose home laws may recog-
nize a subsequent action in its own courts by the U.S. plaintiff (in the
current action in the U.S. court) to enforce a U.S. money judgment has
a most difficult choice. If he makes a special appearance before the U.S.
court to contest subject matter jurisdiction, he may be deemed by his
own courts to have submitted to personal jurisdiction, thus making it
easier for the plaintiff to sue to enforce a successful judgment. 26 If he
fails to appear, he risks the application of sanctions against his U.S. assets
upon entry of a default judgment.
This international tension has been exacerbated to a volatile extent
by the ongoing Westnghouse Uranium Antitrust Lit'gaiton.27 The circum-
stances that led to this litigation arose in the 1960's when the U.S. Gov-
ernment announced a continued embargo on the importation of
uranium, an action which closed off "a major portion of the world's mar-
ket to businessmen who had theretofore sold into [the U.S.] market."'28
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had, for years, encouraged for-
eign uranium producers to exploit their uranium resources to enhance
U.S. access to uranium for national security. Thereafter, however, large
domestic uranium deposits were discovered and began to be exploited.
The U.S. Government made the decision to impose an embargo on the
importation of foreign uranium for sale to private customers (utilities) in
the U.S. market. The AEC also stopped U.S. governmental purchases of
26 Amicus Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom at Exhibit B-Memorandum
by the Solicitor to the U.K. Dep't of Trade, In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp.
1138 (N.D. I11. 1979) (citing a Court of Appeals case, which probably applies in Canada and
Australia as well as the United Kingdom).27 See note 7 supra. For other articles discussing the case, see generally GRIFFIN, supra note
10; Augustine, Obtaining IntenationalJudicial Assi siance Under the Federal Rules and The Hague Con-
vention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad An Exposition ofthe Procedures and a Practical Example-In re
Westinghouse Uranium Contract Litigation, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 101 (1980); Merhige, The
Westinghouse Uranium Case. Problems Encountered in Seeking Foreign Discovery and Evidence, 13 INT'L
LAW. 19 (1979); Comment, The International Uranium Cartel: Litigation and Legal Implications, 14
TEx. INT'L L.J. 59 (1979).
28 Conftrmation Hearings on John H. Shnefr1ld, Nominee, Associate Attorney General: Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on theJudicia7y, 96th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 73 (1979-1980). The em-
bargo was originally imposed in 1964 when Congress provided that the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission "to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium
industry, shall not offer such services for source or special nuclear materials of foreign origin
intended for use in a utilization facility within or under the jurisdiction of the United States."
Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act, Pub. L. No. 88-489, § 16, 78 Stat. 602
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v)(B) (1976)).
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uranium from foreign suppliers. It is ironic and significant that the effect
of this policy was to establish a blatantly anticompetitive U.S. domestic
boycott, a kind of U.S. buyers' cartel, plunging foreign uranium produ-
cers into a severely depressed market situation. Not surprisingly, many
of the foreign producers, in concert with the governments of their ura-
nium producing countries, organized a sellers' cartel in Paris, in 1972, in
an attempt to prop up the price of uranium, then at the "depressed"
level of approximately $6.00 per pound.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, in the years prior to the forma-
tion of this cartel, had entered into numerous contracts with various util-
ity companies for the sale of nuclear reactor plants. The contracts
provided that Westinghouse would supply uranium fuel for use in the
reactors. "By 1974 Westinghouse had agreed to supply various electric
utilities with 80 million pounds of uranium at an average price of $10.00
per pound,"' 29 but the world market price of uranium had risen drasti-
cally and reached $42.00 per pound. Westinghouse had been "selling
short" and thus owned only 15 million pounds. The cost of supplying
the remainder would have been at least $2 billion, nearly twice the com-
pany's recorded assets at the time. 30 When Westinghouse confessed that
it could not deliver, the utility companies sued Westinghouse for breach
of contract. 3' Westinghouse attempted to defend under the doctrine of
commercial impracticability, U.C.C. section 2-615, and also alleged that
the sellers' cartel in Paris had taken actions which drastically restricted
the availability of uranium and caused prices to increase.32 This defense
ultimately failed, and during the period from 1978 to 1980 Westinghouse
settled the claims against it for substantial amounts. 33
In 1975, the Justice Department (with whom the senior author of
this article was then working) began an investigation into the activities of
the cartel. 34 In the fall of 1976, the Justice Department began a grand
jury investigation of the cartel. The Department in May 1978 concluded
that there was little evidence on which price fixing violations of U.S.
antitrust laws could be proved. 35 The doctrine of comity was also a fac-
29 Augustine, supra note 27, at 135 (citations omitted).
30 1d
31 In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 316
(Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1975); 436 F. Supp. 990 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1977).
32 436 F. Supp. at 995.
33 The aggregate pretax cost of the settlements to Westinghouse has been reported to be
roughly $721 million. See WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. ANNUAL REPORT 29, 37 (1979); see
als WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. ANNUAL REPORT 29, 37 (1978).
The value to the utilities involved would be a much higher figure. For the most accurate
reports of individual settlements see NUCLEONICS WEEK (1978-1980 issues).
34 An article in FORBES magazine was perhaps the first public description of the existence
of the cartel. FORBES, Jan. 15, 1975, at 19.
35 The Justice Department made this decision, according to John Shenefield, based on
several factors. The uranium cartel had a minimal impact on U.S. commerce; the only sale into
the United States during the period of evidenced cartel activity was one of future delivery at a
price only one dollar higher than the world price at the time the cartel was formed (approxi-
mately $7 versus 56), and the price of uranium did not jump up dramatically until significantly
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tor in the Department's decision not to prosecute.3 6
Concurrently with the Justice Department's investigation, Wes-
tinghouse filed suit against thirty foreign and domestic uranium produc-
ing corporations in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
on October 15, 1976, alleging worldwide conspiracy to restrain trade in
violation of U.S. antitrust laws. That suit is still pending and decisions in
a number of interlocutory appeals related to discovery requests have
been handed down.
3 7
Even though there has been no full trial on the merits as of yet, the
private treble damage action and the investigation by the Justice Depart-
ment have provoked a significant international backlash. The fact that
the suit was filed and investigation undertaken as well as the voluminous
extraterritorial discovery requests for both the investigation and the suit
have outraged the governments involved. There are two principle rea-
sons for this reaction. First, the U.S. Government is believed to have
initiated the uranium price problems by enacting the uranium embargo
in the 1960s. Second, governments such as Australia, South Africa, and
Canada view uranium as one of their major national resources. These
countries took steps as governments to save an important national indus-
try which was being jeopardized by the U.S. policy of embargoing ura-
nium imports. They believe that it is inappropriate for U.S. courts
unilaterally to attempt to adjudicate a problem created by acts of U.S.
and foreign governmental policy. The Westinghouse case has thus greatly
exacerbated international tensions in this area of the law.
Because of the application of the effects doctrine by U.S. courts and
especially as a result of the Westinghouse case, many foreign states who
believe that their sovereignty has been infringed have enacted retaliatory
legislation. Early reaction involved the passage of discovery blocking
statutes38 designed to fit the exception to sanctions for refusing to comply
after the period for which there was evidence of the cartel's operation. Foreign governments
were very much involved in the cartel and enacted laws requiring the foreign producers to
charge higher prices. See Confirmation Hearings, supra note 28, at 27-33.
The justice Department did prosecute the Gulf Oil Corporation for participation in a boy-
cott of Westinghouse export sales of uranium and nuclear equipment to foreign markets. Gulf
entered a plea of nolo contendre. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) [ 45,078.
This boycott, however, is not a central element of the suit brought by Westinghouse.
36 Confirmation Hearings, supra note 28, at 32. Comity "is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. ... Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
164 (1895).
37 See note 7 supra.
38 The early discovery blocking statutes include: Business Records Protection Act, 1947,
ONT. REV. STAT. c. 54 (1970) (a reaction to In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Cana-
dian Int'l Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)); Business Concerns Records Act, 1964,
QUE. REV. STAT. c. 278 (1964); Economic Competition Act of June 28, 1956, art. 39, Stb. 401,
as amtnded .y Act of July 16, 1958, Stb. 413 (Netherlands reaction to discovery of foreign oil
company documents arising out of In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280
(D.D.C. 1952); an act actually prohibiting compliance with decisions of foreign courts that
would affect economic competition); Atomic Energy Control Act 1970, CAN. REV. STAT. c. A-
NEW APPROACH TO ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
with discovery orders that was developed in Societe Internationale.39 Such
legislation is defensive in nature, being designed to impede the discovery
process of extraterritorial actions.
Recently, however, retaliatory acts have become more wide-ranging.
In 1979, the Federal Parliament of Australia enacted a law giving the
Commonwealth Attorney-General discretion to order that a foreign anti-
trust judgment not be enforced or that only a specific portion be en-
forced. 40 Great Britain has gone one step further in passing an act that
would not only give authorities the discretion provided in the Australian
Act but would also provide a mechanism whereby a defendant in foreign
antitrust proceedings could recover the portion of the judgment declared
unenforceable in Great Britain (generally, the punitive two-thirds of a
private treble damage action) if the original defendant has assets located
in the United Kingdom. 4 1 A similar bill introduced in the Canadian
Parliament on July 11, 1980 is expected to pass.
42
The enactment of such retaliatory legislation, the progression of
those acts, and the lengths to which states have gone to oppose U.S. ex-
traterritorial enforcement of antitrust laws indicate the hostility with
which such extraterritorial actions are received. The current interna-
tional situation creates a very difficult task for any new U.S. antitrust law
aimed at expanding extraterritorial enforcement. It is in this context
that the reporting requirements of the proposed Cartel Restriction Act of
1979 must be considered.
House Bill 4661 would require U.S. entities to report to the Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission the following three
kinds of joint anticompetitive activities: (1) the establishment of prices,
(2) the allocation of customers or markets, and (3) the restriction of pro-
duction or availability of any product or service.43 These activities
would have to be reported: (1) when the U.S. entity or its foreign subsid-
iary is engaged in such conduct with a competing foreign firm,44 (2)
when it or its foreign subsidiary is required or requested by a foreign
state to engage in such conduct, 45 or (3) when it knows that its foreign
partner in a joint venture is engaging in such activities with a competitor
19 (1970) and the Uranium Information Security Regulations, STAT. 0. & R. 76-644 (1976),
promulgated under the Act (reaction to Westinghouse); Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Cer-
tain Evidence) Act 1976, Austl. Act No. 121 (1976) (reaction to Westinghouse). See generalo Note,
supra note 15.
39 See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra. Some such acts were not enacted in direct
retaliation to U.S. suits. See, e.g., Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act 1964, c.
87, (United Kingdom); S+GB, C.P., COD. PENN. § 271 (1971) (Switzerland).
40 Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act 1979, No. 13, Austl. Acts
(1979). See generally 20 HARV. INT'L L. J. 663 (1979).
41 Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c. 11.
42 [1980] 316 INT'L TRADE REP.'S U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) C-2.
43 H.R. 4661, supra note 1, sec. 2, § 20(a)(l).
44 Id. § 20(a)(1)(A).
45 Id.
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involving the joint venture's product or service.4 6 The U.S. entity would
be required to report within twenty days of the onset of the activity, of
the date of the foreign state's requirement or request, or of the date on
which the entity learned of the joint venture partner's activity. Failure
to report would result in a fine of up to $20,000 for each day during
which the violation occurs with a maximum limit of $1 million for each
violation. 4 7 The Bill would also authorize a penalty of up to $25,000
against any corporate officer or director who knowingly fails to report,
with a prohibition of indemnification by the company.
48
The purpose of the reporting requirements of the Bill is to give U.S.
antitrust officials an early warning system in order to alert them to po-
tential international cartel activities. The reports that would be required
of U.S. entities would enable U.S. antitrust officials to employ diplomatic
or legal means to prevent or limit the effects of trade restraints that are
fostered by foreign governments, multinational corporations, and other
interests antithetical to competition.49 The reporting requirements of
the Bill are, in part, a response to the Westinghouse case and facts discov-
ered in hearings held by the Commerce Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce in which Representative Albert Gore, Jr., the Bill's principal spon-
sor, participated. 50
Until the United States can clarify its own ambivalent attitudes
about international cartels, can find some consensus internationally as to
which cartels are objectionable, and can fashion consistent rules and pro-
cedures for the proper application of U.S. antitrust law to objectionable
cartels, it is desirable to bring early cartel activity to the attention of the
federal officials in charge of antitrust enforcement and those in charge of
U.S. international relations. Notifying these officials will combine diplo-
matic, state-to-state negotiations with restrained antitrust enforcement
by the experts responsible for formulating and implementing national
46 Id. § 20(a)(2). tIhe Federal Trade Commission must notify the Secretary of State, the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, and the Securities and Exchange Commission
when it receives such a report. Id. § 20(b).
47 Id. § 20(c)(1).
48 Id. § 20(c)(2)(A).
49 1980 Heartigs, supra note 3 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr., sponsor of the Bill). For
a thorough discussion of the impetus behind the Bill, see Gore, The Cartel Restrictton Act of 1979."
Response to a Global Economic Problem, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 273 (1979).
The legal codification aspects of the Bill, see notes 3-5 supra, would supplement the report-
ing requirements by assuring that the mere presence of a sovereign act in a cartel would not
preclude a court from examining the motivations behind the anti-competitive activity. 1980
Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.). These codification efforts are impor-
tant to the reporting requirements of the Bill and are themselves highly controversial. Both the
Justice and State Departments have opposed them. See notes 3-5 supra. For the sake of better
focus, however, this article discusses the reporting requirements alone with proposals for their
improvement.
50 See 1980 Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.). Many of the com-
ments and proposals of this article are derived from the testimony of one of its authors, Douglas
E. Rosenthal, in these Hearings.
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antitrust policy. These officials may oppose, to the extent practical, ob-
jectionable international cartel activities and approve unobjectionable
activity. To a large degree, the reporting requirements of the Bill would
do just that, and to that extent they are laudable.
It is necessary to pay significantly greater, less rhetorical, and more
sophisticated attention to international cartel activities. By bringing
such cartels and potential cartels out into the open where they can be
scrutinized, the U.S. Government will be better able to deal with them in
their formative stages. Action could be taken before the parties and con-
cerned governments are locked into an inextricable course of conduct
that will make attempts at enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws a further
source of international tensions.
There are several general problems with the reporting requirements,
however, that must be addressed before making proposals for change.
First, the mere enactment of a new antitrust law directed at extraterrito-
rial actions is likely to be met with renewed hostility by those states that
now feel threatened by what they perceive as U.S. contempt for their
sovereignty and their authority to regulate internal economic activities. 5 1
Enactment of controversial House Bill 4661 in the face of clear messages
from these governments would itself exacerbate these international ten-
sions if conciliatory elements are not embodied within the Bill.
Second, the United States must accept the fact that it no longer has
the economic leverage to force its particular view of the proper economic
order on the rest of the world. Compromises must be made more often
than in the past. The United States has recognized that all cartels are
not objectionable. Orderly marketing agreements, certain international
commodity stabilization treaties, and perhaps even nuclear non-prolifer-
ation agreements are international cartels adhered to by the United
States, and these cartels, like some domestic regulated monopolies, may
bejustified. If it is to be said that certain international cartels are appro-
priate, then candor requires at least some tolerance when others form a
cartel that foreign governments deem appropriate. Thus, cartels should
only be opposed when they are indeed harmful and opposition can be
effective; needless interference should be avoided on all levels.
Third, the reporting requirements appear to reach beyond the scope
of U.S. jurisdiction that has so far been sanctioned by the courts.
Whereas U.S. jurisdiction is limited to activities that have a direct affect
51 Representative Gore has stated that foreign nations such as Britain, Australia, and Ca-
nada have shown contempt for the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws by enacting
retaliatory legislation. 1980 Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.). Such a
viewpoint ignores the legitimate interests of those states which have viewed the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. antitrust laws as showing contempt for their very sovereignty. Because they would
likely perceive House Bill 4661 in the same manner, further foreign retaliatory legislation may
follow enactment of the Bill in its present form. Such an international slugging match is not in
the best interests of anyone. Compromises must be made on each side if either group's interests
are to be effected.
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on U.S. commerce, 52 the activities the Bill requires to be reported con-
tain no such limitation. The reporting requirements should be made
consistent with limitations on U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Fourth, the requirements that reports must be made with respect to
the activities of all subsidiaries and joint venture partners are impractical
and overly broad. It is not possible for officers and directors of U.S. enti-
ties to know every activity of their joint venture partners or even their
subsidiaries. The reporting of activities of joint venture partners and
subsidiaries should only be required if a more definite standard of actual
knowledge is added to the Bill.
Fifth, the reporting requirements may have the counterproductive
effect of making it more difficult for U.S. businessmen to compete inter-
nationally. U.S. concerns would be required to set up a monitoring sys-
tem to spot conduct that should be reported, an added cost of business.
The reporting requirements are also rather difficult to interpret. It is
relatively easy to know that when one is asked to set the price of widgets
at $5, one would have to report; but it is more difficult to know what
activity "may be construed to relate to" the substantive standards of the
Bill.5 3 For instance, when it is mentioned at the breakup of a meeting
that "it sure would be easier if you and I weren't going head to head in
Chile's widget market," would one have to report? Such ambiguities as
well as the requirements themselves may intimidate U.S. businessmen
and may make foreign businesses reluctant to deal with U.S. entities.
Another part of the danger of reduced competition comes from the fact
that the only incentive to report under the Bill is the negative incentive
of avoiding the potential fines.54 The Bill would be less likely to intimi-
date U.S. concerns if it provided some positive incentive for reporting.
Specific suggestions for improving the reporting requirements of
House Bill 4661 follow. These suggestions are an attempt to meet the
general objections outlined above as well as more specific objections to be
mentioned. These suggestions are intended to be consistent with the gen-
eral purpose of the Bill.
First, the reporting requirements should be made consistent with a
restrained view of U.S. sovereignty. As noted earlier, most nations of the
world do not consider as appropriate the U.S. practice of requiring for-
eign persons residing abroad to provide information in connection with
U.S. judicial proceedings and law enforcement investigations.55 Further,
while U.S. law deems foreign subsidiaries of American enterprises to be
components of U.S. persons and thus subject to U.S. jurisdiction, all
52 See notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text supra.
53 See 1980 Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of William T. Lake).
54 The further negative incentive of avoiding potential antitrust suits has always been
present, although further down the line. It should be noted that positive incentives for U.S.
entities to report would make the Bill more likely rather than less likely to intimidate foreign
entities because their Bill-covered activities would more often come to light.
55 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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states consider those subsidiaries incorporated and doing business within
their territories to be their nationals. The United States does not have
the clout or the right unilaterally to impose its legal values on others
when its domestic law is not accepted international law. If the Cartel
Restriction Act is to attempt to generate a new consensus and a climate
for international dealing which will allow objectionable international
cartels to be identified and limited by mutual agreement, the reporting
requirements should be limited to U.S. persons residing in the United
States. The Bill should not seek to impose reporting requirements on
foreign persons or foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parents.
Second, the reporting requirements should be limited both substan-
tively and jurisdictionally to a small class of conduct as to which there is
a significant possibility of substantial adverse impact to U.S. persons.
The Bill does so substantively by requiring reports only on potential ac-
tivities of price fixing, allocation of markets or customers, or limitation of
production or supplies. A fourth category of substantive conduct should
be added, that of international boycotts for an economic purpose or with
an economic effect. Boycotts, like other forms of substantive conduct in-
cluded in the Bill, are generally treated as one of the more serious forms
of anticompetitive conduct. 56 Otherwise, the substance of the activities
required to be reported is not objectionable.
Jurisdictionally, however, the reports should be required only when
those substantive activities are likely to have a direct and substantial ef-
fect on U.S. markets or are likely directly and substantially to foreclose
U.S. export competition. Such a limitation is consistent with U.S. views
of proper extraterritorial jurisdiction.57 If the reporting requirements are
so limited, many types of agreements will be excluded. For example,
proposed legislation so limited would not reach international joint ven-
ture agreements having only an indirect impact on the United States,
nor would it reach restrictive licenses between an actual and potential
competitor. This change would prevent what would otherwise amount
to unreasonable burdens on reporting entities, chilling export and joint
venture opportunities of U.S. entities, and unneccessarily antagonizing
friendly foreign states.
Third, the reporting requirements should apply only when control
persons of U.S. entities have actual knowledge of participation or a re-
quest to participate in the activities covered by the Bill. The law should
encourage compliance in order to promote the early identification of cer-
56 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klors, Inc. v. Broadway
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 254 U.S. 600
(1914).
57 &e text accompanying notes 9-10 supra. It is important to note that the Justice Depart-
ment, the State Department, and the Federal Trade Commission all had this same difficulty
with the scope of the reporting requirements proposed by the Bill. 1980 Hearings, supra note 3
(statements of John H. Shenefield, William T. Lake, and Ronald B. Rowe, who is the Assistant
Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission).
96 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
tain important cartel activity. It should not intimidate persons who are
required to report. Further, it is neither fair nor desirable to hold a U.S.
business executive responsible for judgment errors by subordinates, espe-
cially subordinates working for foreign subsidiaries, when that executive
has no actual knowledge or any reasonable basis for having actual
knowledge of such cartel involvement.
Fourth, applying the same lines of reasoning, the requirements
should provide a positive incentive to report. When a control person of a
U.S. entity learns that a foreign subsidiary has entered into cartel activi-
ties requiring reporting, he and the corporation should be given an in-
ducement to report and should not be put in the position of potentially
subjecting themselves to criminal and civil antitrust liability, including
treble damage actions, as a direct result of their compliance with these
reporting requirements. Such a situation would arise whenever cartel
participation is discovered after the fact. Requiring the individual cor-
porate officers to so report and subject themselves to potential criminal
liability would risk a violation of the fifth amendment's prohibition
against forced self incrimination. 58 Additionally, the fact that they
might be able to avoid a conviction because of constitutional protections
would not likely make them any more eager to report. Further, the po-
tential liability for all parties resulting from a combination of criminal
and civil actions by the government, and especially from private treble
damage actions, may be so great as to make the potential fine under
House Bill 4661 irrelevant to a corporation that might consider taking
the chance of not being discovered. Thus, while the only present incen-
tive in reporting is the avoidance of a fine, there are many serious disin-
centives to reporting. Such disincentives might prevent the Bill from
serving its intended purpose and should not be permitted.
Therefore, a mechanism along the following lines should be devised
to give U.S. persons a positive incentive to report. 59 After the reporting
requirements have been fulfilled, the reporting entity should be given a
reasonable opportunity to terminate its participation in the international
58 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
59 The idea for this mechanism is similar, but of independent origin, to the approach
recently announced by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice towards voluntary
disclosure of antitrust violations. The Antitrust Division will, apparently, seriously consider
lenient treatment of corporations or officers who voluntarily report their wrongdoings prior to
detection. Several of the factors that are weighed in that decision have been adopted here either
explicitly or implicitly. These are the considerations of whether the corporation has made resti-
tution to injured parties, whether the corporation promptly terminated its activity after discov-
ering it, and whether the Division could have reasonably expected that it would have become
aware of the activity in the near future had the corporation not reported it. Shenefield, The
Disclosure of Antitrust Violations and Prosecutonal Discretion, Remarks Before The 17th Annual
A.B.A. Corporate Counsel Institute (Oct. 4, 1978), reprinted in 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 463 (1980).
Whereas the Division seems to have adopted a balancing approach to determining whether
to recommend leniency in the ordinary voluntary disclosure case, id. at 466, we are proposing a
more predictable rule for the international cartel context. This would best assure that cartel
activities are reported, as that is the primary object of the Bill.
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cartel and agree to make restitution by mutual settlement or by litigating
in a court of law the amount of actual damages sustained by those within
U.S. jurisdiction who can prove that they were proximately injured by
the cartel. If the reporting entity undertakes such curative conduct in
good faith, it should be exempted from any further liability as a result of
its limited participation in the international cartel. The exemption
should include both criminal and civil sanctions by U.S. antitrust en-
forcement agencies as well as the punitive provisions of the private treble
damage law. This "safe harbor" mechanism would increase the likeli-
hood of compliance with the reporting requirements, would give busi-
nessmen more confidence about the potential effects of the Bill when
competing internationally, and would better promote the Bill's purpose
of early identification of important international cartel problems.
The "safe harbor" mechanism would not be available to persons
who reported only after their cartel participation was made public or was
discovered by law enforcement agencies. It would only be available to
persons acting in good faith when their conduct was not known but for
the reporting. This proposal, drafted carefully into the Bill, should
greatly' enhance the Act's ability to thwart objectionable cartel activity.
Fifth, consistent with the foregoing, where the report is of a request
by a foreign person or state to participate in international cartel activity,
the reporting person should be given the opportunity of seeking a trans-
action review from the antitrust enforcement agency. 60 If, after review-
ing the proposed transaction, the agency determines either that the firm's
potential participation in the international cartel would not violate U.S.
law or that it would not be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, such
determination should provide the reporter with immunity against a sub-
sequent private treble damage action by plaintiffs who seek to litigate the
same facts reviewed by the antitrust enforcement agency. Such a provi-
sion would go far towards encouraging reports of requests, thereby illu-
minating cartel activity at a very early stage.
Sixth, the Justice Department should be given exclusive jurisdiction
60 The Justice Department presently has a Business Review Procedure along these lines.
28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1980). The formal clearance procedure does not expressly exempt that
cleared reporting entity from further liability under private treble damage actions, but gener-
ally such actions would be difficult to win after clearance had been obtained from the Justice
Department.
We propose a formal immunity, however, because the experts in government enforcement
should be able to make some final decisions in the international area. For one thing, private
actions can arouse grave international reactions regardless of whether or not they are eventually
won by the plaintiff, as the Westtnghouse case illustrates. Additionally, the government enforce-
ment agencies can best represent the interests of the United States in the international area by
balancing a vigorous desire to enforce U.S. antitrust laws with the desire to promote competi-
tion in the long run and the desire to promote international harmony. A carefully restrained
program of enforcing those laws, when enforcement would be beneficial, and avoiding those
cases that would create more trouble than they are worth, can best be run by government
antitrust enforcement agencies. Once such decisions are made in the international area, private
actions should be barred.
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over the receipt and evaluation of all reports as opposed to sharing such
jurisdiction with the Federal Trade Commission. One reason exclusive
jurisdiction is necessary is that international cartel activities for which
reports would be required involve potential criminal liability, and only
the Justice Department has jurisdiction for criminal antitrust enforce-
ment. In addition, international cartels are extremely complex and re-
quire a high degree of expertise, and the Justice Department has
considerably greater expertise in the area of foreign commerce than does
the Commission. Furthermore, as a Department of the Executive
Branch, the Justice Department is able to seek the views of the Depart-
ments of State, Commerce, and Treasury, as well as the United States
Trade Representative, among others, when evaluating implications of
the possibilities for resisting various types of international cartel activity.
Because the Federal Trade Commission is a semiautonomous regulatory
agency, it has not developed the same interdepartmental consultation
channels. Lack of these communication channels limits the Commis-
sion's competence to act in this area. Thus, on balance, the Bill's purpose
would be better effected by granting exclusive jurisdiction for receipt and
evaluation of reports to the Justice Department, recognizing that the De-
partment can draw on the expertise of the FTC when necessary.
Finally, the Cartel Restriction Act should require other departments
of the Executive Branch to consult the Department of Justice for its view
on the antitrust law and policy implications of any U.S. Government
initiatives to organize or facilitate international cartel agreements. If the
Department had known in the 1960's that the U.S. Government was go-
ing to establish an embargo to prevent foreign producers from marketing
uranium in the United States to the detriment of the producers and U.S.
utilities and electrical power consumers alike, 61 the Department most
likely would have opposed that policy quite vigorously in accord with its
present policy of competition advocacy in international trade. The per-
sonnel of the Justice Department could have anticipated many of the
harmful consequences that have resulted from this embargo and could
conceivably have stopped such activity at the earliest and best time possi-
ble. Because the United States deems it desirable at times to take actions
which have anticompetitive effects, such required interagency consulta-
tions within our own government would aid the prior consideration of
such potential ramifications as occurred in the uranium industry. Ad-
ding this requirement to the Bill would certainly strengthen its purpose.
In conclusion, the reporting requirements of the Cartel Restriction
Act could be amply strengthened and sensibly restrained by the above
proposals. The form of the Bill proposed herein would substantially en-
hance the enforcement of U.S. antitrust policies in a manner that is con-
sistent with U.S. international obligations and interests. These
provisions would enable enforcement agencies to oppose objectionable
61 See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
NEW APPROACH TO ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 99
cartels while maintaining necessary respect for the sovereignty of U.S.
trading partners. The provisions would also indicate that the U.S. Con-
gress does not intend to enact its own retaliatory legislation to counter
foreign retaliatory legislation, but rather intends to promote its antitrust
policies in a manner more conducive to international harmony.

